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1 
Imer B. Flores, Mexico City / Mexico 
 
H.L.A.  Hart’s  “The  Concept  of  Law”  and  the  Moderate  Indeterminacy 
Thesis Reconsidered 
 
Abstract: In this article the author, in the context of the fiftieth anniversary of H.L.A. Hart’s “The 
Concept of Law”, reconsiders the moderate indeterminacy of law thesis, which derives from the open 
texture of language. For that purpose, he intends: first, to analyze Hart’s moderate indeterminacy 
thesis,  i.e.  determinacy  in  “easy  cases”  and  indeterminacy  in  “hard  cases”,  which  resembles 
Aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean”; second, to criticize his moderate indeterminacy thesis as failing to 
embody the virtues of a center in between the vices of the extremes, by insisting that the exercise of 
discretion required constitutes an “interstitial” legislation; and, third, to reorganize an argument for 
a truly “mean” position, which requires a form of weak interpretative discretion, instead of a strong 
legislative discretion. 
Keywords: Adjudication, Discretion, Indeterminacy, Interpretation, Legislation 
 
I. Introduction 
Reconsider  H.L.A.  Hart’s  legacy  in  the  golden  anniversary  of  The  Concept  of  Law,
1  in 
general, and his moderate indeterminacy of law thesis, in particular, are the principal aims of 
this article. Actually, Hart is considered unarguably among the jurists who contributed more 
to jurisprudence in the second half of the Twentieth Century, by restoring legal philosophy to 
a central place in the study of both law and (general) philosophy. Certainly,  The Concept of 
Law was quintessential for that purpose and has been highly influential ever since the original 
publication  in  1961  and  subsequently  with  the  appearance  of  the  2
nd  edition  with  a 
“Postscript” (edited by Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz) in 1994.
2  
Personally, I consider as the core contributions of Hart: (1) The concept of law as a 
(complex) model of rules --i.e. the union of primary and secondary rules-- thesis; (2) The 
separation of law and morals thesis; and (3) The moderate indeterminacy of law --following 
the open texture of language-- thesis. In what follows, I will reconsider the third thesis, but 
the first and second theses will be reconsidered as well. Hence, in this paper, I am assuming a 
conceptual methodology in which normative argument is relevant but my analysis intends to 
remain  mostly  descriptive  with  three  main  objectives:  first,  to  analyze  Hart’s  moderate 
indeterminacy thesis, i.e. determinacy in “easy cases” and indeterminacy in  “hard cases”, 
                                                           
1 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 1961. 
2 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 1994.  
2 
which, I argue, resembles Aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean”; second, to criticize his moderate 
indeterminacy thesis as failing to embody the virtues of a center in between the vices of the 
extremes,  by  insisting  that  the  exercise  of  discretion  required  constitutes  an  “interstitial” 
legislation; and, third, to reorganize an argument for a truly “mean” position, which requires a 
form of weak interpretative discretion, instead of a strong legislative discretion.
3 
 
II. The Moderate Indeterminacy Thesis 
Regarding  the  problems  of  legal  reasoning,  in  general,  and  legal  interpretation  (and 
adjudication), in particular,
4 H.L.A. Hart adopts, analogously to Hans Kelsen , a moderate 
version of the indeterminacy thesis, which is both  epistemic and systemic.
5 Let me advance, 
that for the Austrian jurist, such indeterminacy derives mainly from the “hierarchical structure 
of the legal system”,
6 whereas for the British legal philosopher, such indeterminacy derives 
mostly  from  the  “open  texture  of  language”.
7  Moreover,  in  my  opinion,  Hart’s  strategy 
additionally resembles Aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean”.
8 
This  strategy  is  quite  explicit  throughout  Hart’s  work
9  and  becomes  self-evident  by 
bringing into attention both the title of chapter VII of his The Concept of Law: i.e. “Formalism 
and Rule-Scepticism”,
10 and the subtitle of his 1977 Sibley Lecture “American Jurisprudence 
                                                           
3 Most of indeterminacy talk is related to language --and meaning-- and can be characterized as linguistic --and 
semantic-- indeterminacy. However, at this point, I would like to introduce a distinction between two additional 
kinds of indeterminacy relevant to law. On the one hand, there is epistemic indeterminacy related to uncertainty, 
i.e. our inability to know which the (correct) answer is to a legal dispute. On the other hand, there is systemic 
indeterminacy related to incompleteness, i.e. our inability to reach a (single) answer in a legal dispute, which 
may contingently derive from language but not necessarily reduced to it. In short, there is epistemic 
indeterminacy when there is no way of knowing which the (correct) answer is; and systemic indeterminacy when 
there is no way of reaching a (single) answer. In that sense, law may be affected by linguistic --and semantic-- 
indeterminacy and appear to have systemic indeterminacy but not necessarily if there is a way of reaching a 
(single) answer transcending the linguistic --and semantic-- indeterminacy. I am indebted to Ken Himma for 
asking me to introduce this distinction and even for proposing some labels. 
4 It is worth to mention that Hart prepared the entry “Problems of the Philosophy of Law” for Paul Edward’s 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which was published originally, in 1967, containing only two sets of problems: 
“Problems of Definition and Analysis”; and, “Problems of the Criticism of Law”. But in the revised version 
published in his “brown book”, in 1983, he included a third set, inserted in between the two original ones, 
namely: “Problems of Legal Reasoning”. Vid. H.L.A. Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, in: Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 1983, 98-109. 
5 Vid. Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, 2002, 77-89; Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of 
Law, 1967, 349-50; Hart (note 1), 121-50; Hart (note 2), 124-54. Vid. also Duncan Kennedy, A Left 
Phenomenological Critique of the Hart/Kelsen Theory of Legal Interpretation, in: Legal Reasoning: Collected 
Essays, 2008, 153-73. 
6 Kelsen (note 5), Introduction, at 77. 
7 Hart (note 1), 124; and Hart (note 2), 128. 
8 Cfr. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in: The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, 1941, Book II, 
Chapter VI, 1106
b, 36-1107
a, 6, at 959. 
9 Vid. for example, Hart (note 1), 191-2; Hart (note 2), 196: “But if men are not devils, neither are they angels; 
and the fact that they are a mean between these two extremes is something which makes a system of mutual 
forbearances both necessary and possible.” 
10 Hart (note 1), 121; Hart (note 2), 124.  
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through English Eyes”: i.e. “The Nightmare and the Noble Dream”,
11 both of which allow 
Hart to stand somewhere in a center between extremes represented not only by formalism and 
anti-formalism, i.e. rule-skepticism; but also by realism, i.e. nightmare (or “too bad to be 
remembered”) and idealism, i.e. noble dream (or “too good to be true”). 
 
1. Hans Kelsen’s Frame 
Before  proceeding  with  Hart,  let  me  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  for  Kelsen  the 
“indeterminacy” derives from the “hierarchical structure of the legal system” and is labeled as 
(more  or  less)  “relative”  to  the  levels  --higher  or  lower--  of  the  legal  system  and  to  the 
movement from one level to the next. In that sense, the higher-level norm determines the 
process for the creation of the lower-level norm and possibly the content as well --or at least 
to some extent. As Kelsen acknowledges:
12 
This determination, however, is never complete. The higher-level norm cannot be binding with 
respect to every detail of the act putting it into practice. There must always remain a range of 
discretion, sometimes wider, sometimes narrower, so that the higher-level norm, in relation to the 
act of applying it (an act of norm creation or of pure implementation), has simply the character of 
a frame to be filled in by way of the act. Even a meticulously detailed command must leave a 
number of determinations to those carrying it out. If official A orders official B to arrest subject 
C, B must use his own discretion to decide when, where, and how he will carry out the warrant to 
arrest C; and these decisions depend upon external circumstances that A has not foreseen and, for 
the most part, cannot foresee. 
Additionally, Kelsen distinguishes between two kinds of “indeterminacy”: “intended” 
and “unintended”.
13 According to him, the former can be part of the intention of authority 
issuing the higher-level norm, who decides to leave open for later settlement (by authorities 
responsible of determining the lower-level norms) not only the answer to the question “what” 
is the prescribed act but also “why” it is so; and, the latter can transcend the intention of the 
authority issuing the higher-level norm due to: (1) the ambiguity (or vagueness) of a word or a 
phrase  used  in  expressing  the  norm;  (2)  the  discrepancy,  which  can  be  total  or  partial, 
between the linguistic expression of the norm and the will of the norm-issuing authority; and 
                                                           
11 H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, in: Essays 
(note 4), 123-44. 
12 Kelsen (note 5), Introduction, at 78 (emphasis added). 
13 Ibid., pp. 78-80. It is worth to mention that in the English translation of the second edition of Reine 
Rechtslehre the word “indeterminacy” has been changed into “indefiniteness”. Vid. Kelsen (note 5), Pure, at 
349-50.  
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(3) the contradictory existence of at least two norms purporting to be simultaneously valid 
and applicable to the same factual situation.
14 In Kelsen’s own voice:
15 
In all these cases of intended or unintended indeterminacy of the lower level, various possibilities 
for applying the higher-level norm suggest themselves. The legal act of applying the legal norm 
can be made to correspond to one or another of the several possible readings of the norm. Or it 
can be made to correspond to the norm-issuer’s will, however discovered, or to the expression he 
chooses. Or, in the case of the two norms contradicting each other, the legal act can be made to 
correspond to one or the other of them, or it can be so fashioned that decisions are taken as if 
norms abrogated one another. In all these cases the norm to be applied is simply a frame within 
which various possibilities for application are given, and very act that stays within this frame, in 
some possible sense filling it in, is in conformity with the norm. 
Kelsen  not  only  advocates  that  the  norm  to  be  interpreted  represents  a  frame 
encompassing the cognition of various possibilities for application but also challenges the 
“traditional jurisprudence” for its formalist inclination to “believe that, invariably, when the 
statute is applied in the concrete case, it can provide only one correct decision, and that the 
‘correctness’ of this decision --its correctness in terms of the positive law-- is based on the 
statute itself.”
16 In his words:
17 
From the standpoint of the positive law, however, there is no criterion on the basis of which one 
of the possibilities given within the frame of the norm to be applied could be favoured over the 
other possibilities. In terms of the positive law, there is simply no method of according to which 
only one of the several readings of a norm could be distinguished as ‘correct’ --assuming, of 
course, that several readings of the meaning of the norm are possible in the context of all the 
other norms of the statute or of the legal system. In spite of every effort, traditional jurisprudence 
has not yet found an objectively plausible way to settle the conflict between will and expression. 
Every method of interpretation developed thus far invariably leads merely to a possible result, 
never to a single correct result. 
In short, Kelsen is right that as a matter of empirical fact within a frame there is not one 
but many possible applications of a norm and that the authority responsible for determining 
the lower-level norm is not invariably (or mechanically) in a position to reach the single one 
and even less that its decision is necessarily the correct one, i.e. an epistemic indeterminacy. 
Nevertheless, he is apparently wrong in assuming a systemic indeterminacy, i.e. that there is 
never a single answer following not from the legal statute itself but from the law and the legal 
system as such. In my opinion, Kelsen fails to distinguish between the application of one of 
                                                           
14 Kelsen (note 5), Introduction, at 78-80. 
15 Ibid., p. 80 (emphasis added). 
16 Ibid., p. 81. 
17 Id. (emphasis added).  
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the various cognitive possibilities and the justification of such application as the correct one 
required by the law as a whole. In that sense, by pointing to the discretion of the authority to 
determine  the  lower-level  norm,  i.e.  to  choose  contingently  among  the  various  possible 
applications one but not necessarily the correct one, he is falling not only short of the aims of 
a  truly  pure  (normative)  theory  of  law,  which  separates  law  both  from  fact  and  from 
morality,
18 but also giving up totally a claim for “legal certainty” by labeling it an “illusion”.
19 
At  this  point,  let  me  bracket  his  double  rejoinder  that  such  decision:  (1)  is  --or 
constitutes-- an act of norm creation (or discretion in a strong sense); and (2) transforms the 
norm of morality, justice or so on into a norm of positive law.
20 Actually, for that purpose, we 
turn now to Hart’s account and to the question on whether he provides a better --or even 
successful-- answer to the problems at hand. 
 
2. H.L.A. Hart’s Core and Penumbra 
As stated before, for Hart the systemic indeterminacy --or the so-called “open texture”-- of 
law  derives  from  the  “open  texture  of  language”.  His  analytical  argument  seems  well 
structured and runs as follows: If all language (considered as a whole) is open textured (or has 
open texture) and law is expressed in (terms of) language; thus, it logically follows that law is 
open textured (or has open texture), and as such is indeterminate (or has indeterminacy): 
All language is open textured 
Law is expressed in language 
∴ Law is open textured 
In my opinion, Hart’s inference is wrong: from the fact that all language (considered as a 
whole) is open textured (or has open texture) and law is expressed in (terms of) language; it 
does not follow that law is open textured (or has open texture), and as such is indeterminate 
(or has indeterminacy). At most, what Hart is able to demonstrate is that --since language and 
law are so closely interrelated-- the open texture of language is present in law, but more 
precisely in the language in which law is expressed. Moreover, that neither does mean that 
law as a whole is necessarily open textured (or has open texture) nor that law is not prepared 
to deal with the open texture of language by appealing to something else beyond language to 
declare its meaning. In terms of Roberto Mangabeira Unger the latter is nothing but a form of 
“false necessity”.
21  
                                                           
18 Vid. Stanley Paulson, Introduction, in: Kelsen (note 5), Introduction, at xxvi.  
19 Kelsen (note 5), Introduction, at 83-4. 
20 Ibid., 82-3. 
21 Cfr. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task. A Critical Introduction to Politics, 
a Work in Constructive Social Theory, 1987.  
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Let me clarify, I am neither denying that all language is open textured (or has open 
texture) nor that law is expressed in (terms of) language, but I am skeptical of reducing both 
law to (a form of) language and legal rationality to (a form of) linguistic rationality. Certainly, 
language is used to express propositions, in general, and propositions about law, i.e. legal 
propositions, in particular, but clearly law is neither identical to such propositions nor to 
language. From the fact that law is “identified in words” that are “verbally extricated” or 
“verbally formulated”
22 --explicitly and even implicitly-- it neither does follow that law is (or 
can be) exhausted by nor is (or can be) reduced to language. In that sense, being expressed in 
(terms of) language is  a necessary but  not  a sufficient  condition  of law;  and, that’s why 
language can neither be the unique, i.e. the one and only, criteria in law nor the ultimate one.
23 
Anyway, we will proceed with the exam of the merits and demerits of Hart’s account: 
First,  Hart  --akin  to  Kelsen--  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that  (some  degree  of) 
indeterminacy in law is inevitable, since sometimes --or most of the time-- it is necessary to 
leave certain issues open for later settlement, and also relative. But unlike Kelsen, Hart bases 
it mainly in the “open texture of language” and not in the “hierarchical structure of law”.
24 
Second, Hart --alike Kelsen-- suggests that “the authoritative general language in which a 
rule is  expressed may  guide only  in  an uncertain  way much as an  authoritative example 
does”
25  and  identifies  “two  connected  handicaps”:  “The  first  handicap  is  our  relative 
ignorance of fact; the second is our relative indeterminacy of aim.”
26 
Third, Hart --analogous to Kelsen-- reaches the conclusion that some form of discretion 
(i.e. choice) is inevitable but, unlike the Austrian jurist, he holds that it is due to the open 
texture of language --and for him also of law. For that purpose, reintroduces the “No vehicles 
in the park” example.
27 In Hart’s voice:
28 
Faced with the question whether the rule prohibiting the use of vehicles in the park is applicable 
to some combination of circumstances in which it appears indeterminate, all that the person 
called upon to answer can do is to consider (as does one who makes use of a precedent) whether 
the present case resembles the plain case ‘sufficiently’ in ‘relevant’ respects. The discretion thus 
left to him by language may be very wide; so that if he applies the rule, the conclusion, even 
though it may not be arbitrary or irrational, is in effect a choice. 
                                                           
22 Hart (note 1), 122-3; Hart (note 2), 125-6. 
23 I am indebted with Ken Himma for calling me to make explicit some ideas that remained implicit in the 
previous paragraphs. 
24 Hart (note 1), 124 and 128; Hart (note 2), 128 and 131. 
25 Hart (note 1), 124; Hart (note 2), 127. 
26 Hart (note 1), 125; Hart (note 2), 128 (emphasis added). 
27 Hart introduced the example in his 1957 Holmes Lecture delivered at Harvard Law School, vid. H.L.A. Hart, 
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in: Essays (note 4), at 49-87. 
28 Hart (note 1), 124; Hart (note 2), 127.  
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Fourth, Hart --like Kelsen-- considers that (in)determinacy is a “matter of degree”: law is 
determinate  in  some  areas  and  indeterminate  in  others.  For  the  Austrian  jurist  law  is 
indeterminate inside the frame and determinate outside it: it is not-law at all; and for the 
British legal philosopher law is determinate in the core and indeterminate in the penumbra.
29 
In Hart’s words, as originally introduced in the Holmes Lecture in 1957:
30 
A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, 
but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about aeroplanes? Are these, as we 
say, to be called ‘vehicles’ for the purpose of the rule or not? If we are to communicate with each 
other at all, and if, as in the most elementary form of law, we are to express our intentions that a 
certain type of behaviour be regulated by rules, then the general words we use --like ‘vehicle’ in 
the case I consider-- must have some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its 
application. There must be a core of settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of 
debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out. 
And, at the end of chapter VI “The Foundations of a Legal System” of his masterpiece 
The Concept of Law in 1961:
31 
All rules involve recognizing or classifying particular cases as instances of general terms, and in 
the case of everything which we are prepared to call a rule it is possible to distinguish clear 
central cases, where it certainly applies and others where there are reasons for both asserting and 
denying that it applies. Nothing can eliminate this duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra 
of doubt when we are engaged in bringing particular situations under general rules. This imparts 
to all rules a fringe of vagueness or ‘open texture’... 
Fifth, Hart --similar to Kelsen-- concludes that there are at least in the peripheral cases no 
correct  decisions  or  right  answers and points  to  the authority  granted  to  those exercising 
choice or discretion and their finality (not infallibility): “there is no answer which is clearly 
right or wrong. These can be settled only by a choice, made by someone to whose choices in 
this matter authority is eventually accorded.”
32 On this point, keep in mind that Hart had 
already wisely stated not only “[I]n an ordinary game ‘the score is what the scorer says it is’ is 
not the scoring rule: it is a rule providing for the authority and finality of his application of the 
scoring rule in particular cases”
33 but also “The scorer may make honest mistakes...”
34 
   
                                                           
29 Vid. Kennedy (note 5), 154. 
30 Hart (note 27), 63 (emphasis added). 
31 Hart (note 1), 119-20; Hart (note 2), 123 (emphasis added). 
32 Hart (note 1), 146; Hart (note 2), 150 (emphasis added). 
33 Hart (note 1), 140; Hart (note 2), 144. 
34 Hart (note 1), 139; Hart (note 2), 142-3.  
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III. Hart in Between... 
So far, both Hart and Kelsen agree in the claim that “indeterminacy” in law is inevitable and 
relative, but disagree in the reason for grounding it: indeterminacy results for the former from 
the “open texture of language”, and for the latter from the “hierarchical structure of law”. 
Additionally, they seem to differ regarding its implications chiefly to legal certainty. In my 
opinion, on the one hand, Kelsen, by calling it a mere “illusion”, throws the baby out with the 
bath water (or even worse throws the baby out and keeps the bath water):
35 interpretation of 
law is uncertain,  i.e.  epistemic  indeterminacy,  and  more  or  less  incomplete,  i.e.  systemic 
indeterminacy. On the other hand, Hart, by standing over the shoulders of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’ prediction/prophecy theory,
36 defends it as a matter of degree: interpretation of law 
is  more  or  less  uncertain,  i.e.  epistemic  indeterminacy,  and  more  or  less  incomplete,  i.e. 
systemic indeterminacy, depending on the open texture of language. 
At the end, it is this strategy, as already advanced, which allows Hart to stand apparently 
somewhere in a center of virtue between extremes of vice not only (1) in between formalism 
and anti-formalism, i.e. rule-skepticism, and (2) in between realism, i.e. the nightmare, and 
idealism, i.e. the noble dream. 
 
1. Formalism and Anti-Formalism (i.e. Rule-Skepticism) 
On one side, Hart appears to give his dues both to formalism agreeing that there are some 
central --or paradigmatic-- cases falling within a core of certainty or settled meaning, but 
disagreeing that all cases are clear and precise; and, to anti-formalism (i.e. rule-skepticism) 
arguing that there are other peripheral cases falling within a penumbra of doubt or unsettled 
meaning, but assenting that not all cases are unclear and imprecise. In that sense, he not only 
distinguishes between clear and envisaged cases (such as the “automobile/motor-car”, the 
“bus”, and the “motor-cycle”) and unclear and unenvisaged ones (such as the “bicycle”, the 
“roller-skates”, and the “toy automobile/motor-car electrically propelled”);
37 but also insists 
                                                           
35 Hart did use this expression to refer to Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia, 1974, vid. H.L.A. Hart, 
1776-1976: Law in the Perspective of Philosophy, in: Essays (note 4) at 145-58. Ibid., 152: “Other theories --
perhaps Professor Nozick’s among them-- do worse: they throw out the baby and keep the bath-water.” 
36 Vid. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, Harvard Law Review, vol. 110, 1997, 991-1009. Ibid., 
993: “If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man who cares only for the 
material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one who finds his reasons 
for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.” Ibid., 994: “But if we 
take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he does want to know what the… courts are likely to 
do in fact. I am much of his mind. The prophecies of what courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, 
are what I mean by the law.” 
37 Vid. Hart (note 27), 63. Vid. also Hart (note 1), 125-6; Hart (note 2), 129.  
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in the existence of “a need for a further exercise of choice in the application of general rules 
to particular cases.”
38 
Actually, it is the abandonment of this need which constitutes the “vice” attributable to 
“formalism  or  conceptualism  [which]  consists  in  an  attitude  to  verbally  formulated  rules 
which both seeks to disguise and to minimize the need for such choice, once the general rule 
has been laid down.”
39 Analogously, it is the mistreatment of another (equally important) 
need  which  constitutes  the  “vice”  attributable  to  anti-formalism  or  realism  --i.e.  rule-
skepticism: an attitude to verbally formulated rules which seeks to disclose and to maximize 
the need for such choice, to the extent that the general rule laid down does nothing at all, i.e. 
does not provide any guideline as such.
40 On the contrary, in order “[t]o escape this oscillation 
between  extremes”,  Hart  proposes  a  virtuous  compromise  between  two  social  needs  and 
suggests:
41 
In fact all systems, in different ways, compromise between two social needs: the need for certain 
rules  which  can,  over  great  areas  of  conduct,  safely  be  applied  by  private  individuals  to 
themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up of social issues, and the need to leave 
open, for latter settlement by an informed, official choice, issues which can only be properly 
appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete case. 
It is clear that the “open texture of language” allows Hart to respect the first competing 
social need while permits him to respond to the second one by appealing to a later informed 
exercise of “official choice” or “discretion”: “In every legal system a large and important field 
is left open for the exercise of discretion by courts and other officials in rendering initially 
vague standards determinate, in resolving the uncertainties of statutes, or in developing and 
qualifying rules only broadly communicated by authoritative precedents.”
42 
At the end, Hart considers that we face a “false dilemma”:
43 
‘Either rules are what they would be in the formalist’s heaven and they bind as fetters bind; or 
there are no rules, only predictable decisions or patterns of behaviour.’ 
In that sense, he suggests:
44 
Formalism and rule-scepticism are the Scylla and Charybdis of juristic theory; they are great 
exaggerations, salutary where they correct each other, and the truth lies between them. Much 
indeed that cannot be attempted here needs to be done to characterize in informative detail this 
                                                           
38 Hart (note 1), 126; Hart (note 2), 129. 
39 Id. 
40 Vid. Hart (note 1), 133; Hart (note 2), 136: “Yet ‘rule-scepticism’, or the claim that talk of rules is a myth, 
cloaking the truth that law consists simply of the decisions of courts and the prediction of them, can make a 
powerful appeal to a lawyer’s candour.” 
41 Hart (note 1), 127; Hart (note 2), 130. 
42 Hart (note 1), 132-3; Hart (note 2), 136. 
43 Hart (note 1), 136; Hart (note 2), 139. 
44 Hart (note 1), 144; Hart (note 2), 147.  
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middle path, and to show the varied types of reasoning which courts characteristically use in 
exercising the creative function left to them by the open texture of law in statute or precedent. 
 
2. Nightmare and Noble Dream 
On the other, Hart seems to pay his dues both to the nightmare agreeing that in some cases 
judges make the law which they apply to litigants, but disagreeing that they never declare the 
existing law;
45 and, to the noble dream arguing that in some cases judges do not make law and 
declare the existing law, but assenting that sometimes they do make (new) law and do not 
declare the existing law --since there is no existing law to be declared. In that sense, American 
Jurisprudence  “has  oscillated  between  two  extremes  with  many  intermediate  stopping-
places.”
46  Anyway,  Hart  acknowledges  that  “Litigants  in  law  cases  consider  themselves 
entitled to have from judges an application of the existing law to their disputes, not to have 
new  law  made  for  them”  and  proceeds  not  only  to  delineate  the  image  of  the  judge  --
following Lord Radcliffe-- as an “objective, impartial, erudite, and experienced declarer of the 
law” but also to distinguish it from the very different image of the legislator: the maker of the 
law, i.e. the law-maker.
47 
In the nightmare view --identified with the American Legal Realism movement of 1920’s 
and  1930’s,  but  the  characterization  is  equally  applicable  to  the  Critical  Legal  Studies 
movement  of  late-1970’s  and  mid-1980’s,  and  other  critical  theories  since  then--
48  the 
distinction between the judge and the legislator   is a mere illusion. The American Legal 
Realists  --especially  Jerome  Frank  and  Karl  N.  Llewellyn --  according  to  Hart  “were 
concerned to stress the legislative opportunities of the courts”
49 and their “main effect was to 
convince many judges and lawyers, practical and academic, of two things”:
50 
[F]irst, that they should always suspect, although not always in the end reject, any claim that 
existing legal rules or precedents were constraints strong and complete enough to determine what 
a  court’s  decision  should  be  without  other  extra-legal  considerations;  secondly,  that  judges 
should not seek to bootleg silently into the law their own conceptions of the law’s aims or justice 
or social policy or other extra-legal elements required for decision, but should openly identify 
and discuss them. 
                                                           
45 Vid. Hart (note 11), 127: “[In] the Nightmare view... judges make the law which they apply to litigants and are 
not impartial, objective declarers of existing law”. Ibid., 128: “[A]s if adjudication were essentially a form of 
law-making, never a matter of declaring the existing law”. 
46 Ibid., 125. 
47 Ibid., 126 (reference is omitted). 
48 Vid. v.gr. Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context, 2003, 177-87 and 217-36. 
49 Hart (note 11), 131. 
50 Ibid., 132.  
11 
On the contrary, in the noble dream view --represented originally by Roscoe Pound, 
among  others,  and  in  a  more  contemporary  version  by  Ronald  Dworkin--  the  distinction 
between the legislator and the judge, as well as their respective functions, i.e. law-making --
ius  dare--  and  law-declaring  --ius  dicere,  is  still  quite  significant.
51  In that sense, Hart 
suggests that the noble dream:
52 
Like its antithesis the Nightmare, it has many variants, but in all forms it represents the belief, 
perhaps the faith, that, in spite even of whole periods of judicial aberrations and mistakes, still an 
explanation  and  a justification  can  be  provided for  the  common  expectation of  litigants  that 
judges should apply to their cases existing law and not make new law for them even when the 
text of particular constitutional provisions, statutes, or available precedents appears to offer no 
determinate guide. And with this goes the belief in the possibility of justifying many other things, 
such as the form of lawyer’s arguments which, entertaining the same expectations, are addressed 
in courts to the judges as if he were looking for, not creating the law; the fact that when courts 
overrule some past decision, the later new decision is normally treated as stating what the law has 
always been, and as a correcting mistake, and is given a retrospective operation; and finally, the 
fact that the language of a judge’s decision is not treated, as is the language of a statute, as the 
authoritative canonical text of a law-making verbal act. 
Finally, Hart concludes:
53 
I have portrayed American jurisprudence as beset by two extremes, the Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream: the view that judges always make and never find the law they impose on litigants, and on 
the opposed view that they never make it. Like any other nightmare and any other dream, these 
two are, in my view, illusions, though they have much of value to teach the jurist in his waking 
hours. The truth, perhaps unexciting, is that sometimes judges do one and sometimes the other. 
 
IV. Hart’s Scylla and Charybdis 
Let me start this section, by recalling Hart’s characterization of formalism and anti-formalism, 
i.e. rule-skepticism, as “the Scylla and Charybdis of juristic theory” and his insinuation that 
“the truth lies between them... [i.e. in the] middle path… which courts characteristically use in 
exercising  the  creative  function  left  to  them  by  the  open  texture  of  law  in  statute  or 
precedent.”
54 By the by, the depiction is equally applicable to realism (i.e. the nightmare) and 
to idealism (i.e. the noble dream), and his suggestion that “Like any other nightmare and any 
                                                           
51 Vid. Imer B. Flores, The Quest for Legisprudence: Constitutionalism v. Legalism, in: The Theory and Practice 
of Legislation: Essays on Legisprudence, ed. Luc J. Wintgens, 2005, 46-7; Imer B. Flores, Legisprudence: The 
Forms and Limits of Legislation, Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho, vol. 1, 2007, 257-60; 
Imer B. Flores, Legisprudence: The Role and Rationality of Legislators --vis-à-vis Judges-- towards the 
Realization of Justice, Mexican Law Review, vol. 1: 2, 2009, 100-6. 
52 Hart (note 11), 132-3. 
53 Ibid., 144. 
54 Vid. supra (note 44).  
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other dream, these two are… illusions, though they have much of value to teach the jurist in 
his  waking  hours.  The  truth,  perhaps  unexciting,  is  that  sometimes  judges  do  one  and 
sometimes the other.”
55  
It is worth to mention that Scylla and Charybdis are mythical sea monsters associated 
with two rocks portrayed by Homer in The Odyssey.
56 The former was described as a six -
headed monster with teeth set in three rows living in a cavern in the higher cliff and the latter 
as a monster that sucks down the water creating a whirlpool living in a fig tree dense with 
foliage in the lower cliff. They were regarded as a sea hazard located close enough to each 
other that they posed an inescapable threat to passing sailors avoiding Charybdis meant 
passing too close to Scylla and vice versa. In that sense, Odysseus --following Circe’s advice-
-
57 opted to pass by Scylla losing only a few sailors, rather than risking the loss of his entire 
ship in the whirlpool: “For you, steersman, I have this order; so store it deeply in your mind, 
as you control the steering oar of this hollow ship; you must keep her clear from where the 
smoke and the breakers are, and make hard for the sea rock lest, without your knowing, she 
might drift that way, and you bring all of us into disaster.”
58 In the words of Aristotle: “For of 
the extremes one is more erroneous, one less so; therefore, since to hit the mean is hard in the 
extreme, we must as a second best, as people say, take the least of evils”.
59 
My  claim  is  that  the  “open  texture  of  language”  allows  Hart  to  stand  apparently 
somewhere in the center between extremes arguing for a moderate indeterminacy, i.e. law is 
sometimes determinate and sometimes indeterminate, and against both a radical determinacy, 
i.e. law is always determinate or never indeterminate, and radical indeterminacy, i.e. law is 
always indeterminate or never determinate. But by characterizing the exercise of choice or 
discretion --required to face the moderate indeterminacy-- as legislative, Hart’s position --as 
Odysseus-- crashes into one of the extremes, i.e. Scylla, the lesser evil, failing to achieve the 
middle path, by suggesting that in those cases judges do legislate. The problem is whether 
there is a truly mean position, i.e. a middle way. 
In a few words, Hart affirms that a “creative judicial activity”
60 is required to face the 
moderate indeterminacy and certainly it implies discretion, but the problem is that he equates 
“creative” to “legislative” and “judicial discretion” to “judicial legislation”. In Hart’s voice:
61 
                                                           
55 Vid. supra (note 53). 
56 Vid. Homer, The Odyssey, in: The Iliad and the Odyssey of Homer, 1952, Book XII, 73-259. 
57 Ibid., 108-10. 
58 Ibid., 217-21. 
59 Aristotle (note 8), Book II, Chapter IX, 1109
a, 33-5, 963. 
60 Hart (note 1), 131; Hart (note 2), 134. 
61 Hart (note 1), 200; Hart (note 2), 204-5.  
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Laws require interpretation if they are to be applied to concrete cases, and once the myths which 
obscure the nature of the judicial processes are dispelled by realistic study, it is patent… that the 
open texture of law leaves a vast field for a creative activity which some call legislative. Neither 
in interpreting statutes nor precedents are judges confined to the alternatives of blind, arbitrary 
choice,  or  ‘mechanical’  deduction  from  rules  with  predetermined  meaning.  Very  often  their 
choice is guided by an assumption that the purpose of the rules which they are interpreting is a 
reasonable  one,  so  that  the  rules  are  not  intended  to  work  injustice  or  offend  settled  moral 
principles…  At  this  point  judges  may  again  make  a  choice  which  is  neither  arbitrary  nor 
mechanical; and here often display characteristic judicial virtues, the special appropriateness of 
which  to  legal  decision  explains  why  some  feel  reluctant  to  call  such  judicial  activity 
‘legislative’. 
I  accept  that  judges  do  realize  a  “creative  judicial  activity”  not  only  by  creating  an 
individual norm to be applied to the case at hand but also by creating at the same time a 
criteria or precedent of interpretation that may be applied to future cases.
62 However, I reject 
that such “creative judicial activity” amounts necessarily to a legislative one. By the way, 
Hart mistakenly describes “two types of creative or legislative activity”:
63 
On  the  one  hand,  courts  deciding  a  later  case  may  reach  an  opposite  decision  to  that  in  a 
precedent by narrowing the rule extracted from the precedent, and admitting some exception to it 
not before considered, or, if considered, left open. This process of distinguishing the earlier case 
involves finding some legally relevant difference between it and the present case, and the class of 
such differences can never be exhaustively determined. On the other hand, in following an earlier 
precedent the courts may discard a restriction found in the rule as formulated from the earlier 
case, on the ground that it is not required by any rule established by statute or earlier precedent. 
To do this is to widen the rule. 
I admit that both narrowing and widening the rule are the product of a “creative judicial 
activity” resulting from the interpretation of a pre-existing rule, but deny that it amounts 
either  to  the  legislative  creation  of  a  (new)  rule  or  to  the  quasi-legislative  change  of  an 
existing rule. In both cases, i.e. narrowing and widening, there is already an existing rule, 
whose scope is narrowed or widened through interpretation, but the rule is neither created out-
of-the-blue  nor  changed  out-of-nothing-at-all  through  legislation  or  quasi-legislation. 
Similarly, I argue that in cases where there are legal gaps to be filled the judge does exercise 
an  interpretative  “creative  judicial  activity”  in  order  to  declare  the  existing  law  or  more 
precisely to cover the gap with pre-existing legal material, including principles and aims or 
purposes. What’s more, when courts overrule a previous decision,  for example, Plessy v. 
                                                           
62 Actually, legislatures, especially in the common law, delegate a limited authority to courts to the extent that it 
can be described as judge-made law through interpretation but not necessarily as judicial legislation. 
63 Hart (note 1), 131; Hart (note 2), 135 (emphasis added).  
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Ferguson with Brown v. Board of Education, it seems that they are not necessarily making 
(new) law nor changing the existing law but recognizing a previous mistake in interpreting the 
law by amending or correcting it.
64 
Notwithstanding,  Hart’  comeback  in  the  “Postscript”  regarding  “judicial  discretion” 
insists on judges having law-making powers and so “judicial legislation”:
65 
[I]n any legal system there will always be certain legally unregulated cases in which on some 
point no decision either way is dictated by the law and the law is accordingly partly indeterminate 
or incomplete. If in such cases the judge is to reach a decision and is not, as Bentham once 
advocated, to disclaim jurisdiction or to refer the points not regulated by the existing law to the 
legislature to decide, he must exercise his discretion and make law for the case instead of merely 
applying already pre-existing settled law. So in such legally unprovided-for or unregulated cases 
the judge both makes new law and applies the established law which both confers and constrains 
his law-making powers. 
And, further, suggests that such legislative powers are “interstitial”:
66 
It is important that the law-creating powers which I ascribe to the judge to regulate cases left 
partly unregulated by the law are different from those of the legislature: not only are the judge’s 
powers subject to many constraints narrowing his choice from which a legislature may be quite 
free, but since the judge’s power are exercised only to dispose of particular instant cases he 
cannot use these to introduce large-scale reforms or new codes. So his powers are interstitial as 
well as subject to many substantive constraints. None the less there will be points where the 
existing law fails to dictate any decision as the correct one, and to decide cases where this is so 
the judge must exercise his law-making powers. 
The part of Hart’s rejoinder referring to “constraints” positions him really close to Kelsen 
--and  even  to  Kennedy.
67  Moreover,  Hart’s  insistence  on  the  nature  of  such  law-making 
powers as interstitial, but legislative still,
68 gets Hart back over the shoulders of Holmes: “I 
                                                           
64 Vid. supra (notes 32-4 and accompanying text). I am not denying that there is a change in the state of affairs 
but affirming that it is corrective of a previous mistaken interpretation and as such neither legislative nor quasi-
legislative, but interpretative. Consider not only Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. 
Ferguson but also his and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ dissenting opinions in Lochner v. New York. In both 
cases, the dissenting opinions: first, denounced a honest mistake in the interpretation made by the majority, 
which even though counted as law; and, later, became part of the prevailing interpretation within the Supreme 
Court, which corrected the previous interpretation. Vid. There Is No Caste Here, in: I Dissent. Great Opposing 
Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court Cases, ed. Mark Tushnet, 2008, 69-80. Vid. also Room for Debate and for 
an Honest Difference of Opinion, in: ibid., 81-92. 
65 Hart (note 2), 272 (emphasis in the original). 
66 Ibid., 273 (emphasis in the original). 
67 Actually, Kennedy --in an attempt to separate himself and to some extent the Critical Legal Studies movement 
form the American Legal Realist movement-- has insisted that the indeterminacy he has in mind is not radical 
since adjudication involves both freedom and constraint coming in terms both with Hart’s and Kelsen’s moderate 
indeterminacy. Vid. Kennedy (note 5), 153-73; Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical 
Phenomenology, in: Legal Reasoning (note 5), 11-85. 
68 Vid. H.L.A. Hart, Introduction, in: Essays (note 4), 6: “[I]n any modern legal system there must be many 
occasions where the settled law fails to dictate a decision either way, so that if courts have to decide such cases  
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recognize  without  hesitation  that  judges  do  and  must  legislate,  but  they  can  do  so  only 
interstitially; they are confined from ‘molar to molecular motions’.”
69 However, the fact of 
being interstitial does not cancel it being legislative. As you can imagine, my feeling is that 
Hart --by appealing to a form of discretion that equates creative to legislative-- misses an 
important distinction and we seem to be in danger of missing too. The distinction I have in 
mind is between “interpretative” and “inventive” (or “legislative”) “creative judicial activity”, 
which corresponds to a “weak” and “strong” forms of discretion,
70 i.e. between the weak 
discretion to interpret the (existing) law --and even implicit principles and aims or purposes-- 
to be applied to the case at hand and the strong discretion to invent (or legislate) the (new) law 
--or even to change the (existing) law. 
After all, Hart acknowledged:
71 
[J]udges do not just push away their law books and start to legislate without further guidance 
from  the  law.  Very  often,  in  deciding  such  cases,  they  cite some  general  principle  or  some 
general  aim  or  purpose  which  some  considerable  relevant  area  of  the  existing  law  can  be 
understood as exemplifying or advancing and which points towards a determinate answer for the 
instant hard case. 
Actually, reconsider Hart’s “No vehicles in the park” example. Imagine that someday a 
boy, called Freddie, who all he wants to do is to learn how to ride his bicycle, comes into a 
park  with  it  and  is  prevented  from  riding  it  by  the  park  keeper,  who  points  out  to  the 
prohibition. Suppose that his mother Mrs. Mercury challenges the decision on his behalf and 
reaches a point in which a judge with final authority has to settle the dispute. It is clear that 
the word ‘vehicles’ is vague but bicycles are typically included in vehicles, but it is unclear 
whether the prohibition incorporates bicycles or not.  
What is the judge expected to do? In other words: Is the judge expected to invent (or 
legislate) a (new) law or to change the (existing) law, acting as a legislator? Or is expected to 
interpret the law, appealing not only to principles but also to aims and purposes? Alternately: 
Is the judge in a position to exercise a strong legislative discretion to go either way? Or is 
expected to exercise a weak interpretative discretion to remain guided in the quest for the 
solution  to  the  case  at  hand?  In  my  opinion,  the  judge  is  expected  to  exercise  a  weak 
interpretative discretion appealing not only to principles but also to aims and purposes. In that 
sense, the prohibition can be said to be intended to protect the users of the park from certain 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
they must exercise a limited ‘interstitial’ law-making power, or ‘discretion’.” 
69 Southern Pacific v. Jensen (Holmes, dissenting). Vid. Hart (note 11), 128. 
70 I am aware that Dworkin introduced the distinction between “weak” and “strong” forms of discretion in “The 
Model of Rules”, but I am distancing from his use and trying to develop it in a way consistent with Hart and with 
a truly “mean” position. Vid. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1978, 31-9 and 68-71. 
71 Hart (note 2), 274.  
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forms of vehicles that might cause a danger to them. The question is whether a boy riding a 
bicycle endangers the rest of the users of the park or it is compatible with them. I believe that 
the judge will rule that the law is that a bicycle per se does not jeopardize them and, for that 
reason, the prohibition “No vehicles in the park” does not apply to bicycles.
72 
 
V. Conclusion 
Taking the distinction seriously implies that judges, instead of exercising a strong inventive 
(or legislative) discretion pushing their law books aside, instead do --and if I may add must-- 
exercise a weak interpretative discretion by appealing not only to principles but also to aims 
and purposes in the quest for further guidance. The problem for Hart --and his followers-- will 
still  be  that  this  “mean”  position,  i.e.  creative  interpretation,  in  between  the  extremes 
represented  by  non-creative  interpretation,  i.e.  deductive  or  mechanical  application,  and 
creative legislation, does echoes his archenemy as Hart himself acknowledged:
73 
This indeed is the very nucleus if the ‘constructive interpretation’ which is so prominent a feature 
of  Dworkin’  theory  of  adjudication.  But  though  this  procedure  certainly  defers,  it  does  not 
eliminate  the  moment  of  judicial  law-making,  since  in  any  hard  case  different  principles 
supporting competing analogies may present themselves and a judge will often have to choose 
between them, relying like a conscientious legislator, on his sense of what it is best and not on 
any already established order of priorities prescribed for him by law. Only if for all such cases 
there was always to be found in the existing law some unique set of higher-order principles 
assigning  relative  weights  or  priorities  to  such  competing  lower-order  principles,  would  the 
moment for judicial law-making be not merely deferred but eliminated. 
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